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The Privatization of Correctional
Institutions: The Tennessee
Experience
W.J. Michael Cody
Andy D. Bennett*
Recently, the privatization of correctional institutions has
been a topic of intense interest both in Tennessee and other parts
of the Nation. In the hope that we might learn from the past, we
undertook to examine Tennessee's convict leasing practices of the
nineteenth century. This Article summarizes that research and
provides a narrative and analysis of the recent events regarding
privatization of correctional institutions in Tennessee.
In 1829 the Tennessee General Assembly, in accordance with a
national reform movement, abolished traditional methods for the
punishment of crimes. Imprisonment replaced whipping, branding,
and stocks.' A law mandating the erection of Tennessee's first penitentiary implemented this new policy. 2 The officials who were to
administer this prison also were authorized to provide work for
each prisoner "best adapted to his or her age, sex and state of
health, having due regard to that employment which is most profitable."'3 Thus Tennessee went on record as favoring humanitarian
reform, but it was reform for which the beneficiaries would pay:
profits from the convicts' labor were to defray the costs of prisoner
confinement.
In 1831 a 200-cell brick and frame prison opened in Nashville,
approximately one mile from the public square.4 Within two years
* W.J. Michael Cody is the Attorney General and Reporter for the State of Tennessee.
Andy D. Bennett is the Deputy Attorney General for the Legislative Affairs and Reporter
Division of the Attorney General's office. The authors wish to express their gratitude to
Robert A. Grunow, former Associate Chief Deputy Attorney General, for his significant contribution to this Article.
1. 1829 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. XXIII, § 1.
2. Id. at ch. V.
3. Id. at ch. XXXVIII, § 25, Rule 15.
4. Crowe, The Origin and Development of Tennessee's Prison Problem, 1831-1871, 15
TENN. HIST. Q. 111-14 (1956).
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of its opening, officials established a small manufacturing plant at
the prison. Through the end of the decade, prisoners engaged in a
variety of industries, including coopering, blacksmithing, and making harnesses, wagons, and shoes.6 Later, convicts quarried and cut
stone for use in the State capitol building.
During the first twenty years of its existence, prison officials
praised the penitentiary as a profitmaking institution. Free
mechanics and tradesmen, however, criticized the use of prison labor as competing with free labor and degrading their respective
trades. By 1853 the Governor of Tennessee agreed. In his annual
legislative message of December 19, 1853, Governor Andrew Johnson strongly condemned the prison as operating a "State
Mechanic Institute" in competition with free laborers.'
Tennessee legislators soon began seeking alternatives to the
penitentiary. Representative Morris of Wayne County introduced a
bill "To farm out the Penitentiary." Representative Hebb of Lincoln County moved to amend Morris' bill to include "giving the
person the power who leased the penitentiary to learn the convicts
various trades, etc." 9 The general assembly quickly reconsidered
and tabled this amendment. 10 The bill was postponed indefinitely
on second reading." Representative Wood's bill "To lease out, regulate and change the present system of penitentiary labor," met a
similar fate, despite the apparent support from a minority report
of the House Penitentiary Committee. 2 The senate defeated a final bill, "To provide for building a public jail and Penitentiary,"
introduced by Senator Farquharson of Franklin and Lincoln
Counties.' 3
The first gubernatorial endorsement of convict leasing in Tennessee probably was made by Governor Isham G. Harris in his legislative message of October 4, 1859. Governor Harris stated that in
light of government's poor record of financial management, "I do
not doubt that the best interests of the State would be promoted
5. Id.
6. Id. at n.14, citing White, Early Experiments with Prison Labor in Tennessee, 12 E.
TENN. HIsT. Soc'ys PUBLICATIONS 49 (1940).
7. Id. at 114.
8. 4 MESSAGES OF THE GOVERNORS OF TENNESSEE 552 (R. White ed. 1957) [hereinafter
MESSAGES] (emphasis in original).
9. 1853 TENNESSEE HOUSE JOURNAL at 698 [hereinafter TENN. H. J.].
10. Id. at 698.
11. Id. at 913.
12. Id. at 741, 923.
13. 1853 TENNESSEE SENATE JOURNAL at 604 [hereinafter TENN. S. J.].
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by leasing out the entire labor of the prison annually. ' 14 His reasoning in support of convict leasing is somewhat suspect, however,
in view of penitentiary officials' claims that the prison actually was
showing a profit.1 5
Soon after Governor Harris' message, state legislators introduced two bills designed to lease out convict labor. Representative
Hebb of Lincoln County introduced House Bill No. 53, which subsequently was withdrawn.16 Senator Stovall of Henry, Weakley,
and Obion Counties introduced legislation in the senate entitled
"A bill to lease out the Penitentiary.' 1 7 The bill authorized and
directed the Governor to lease the penitentiary for four years, after
posting notice and taking an inventory. Three inspectors and a
keeper were to be appointed by the Governor to insure that the
convicts were treated humanely, kindly, and properly and to make
periodic reports to the Governor.' 8 The senate rejected the bill on
the third reading, 9 and later refused to reconsider its action.20
The Civil War left the penitentiary "barren of resources, and
with an indebtedness, large in aggregate, uncertain in amount, and
held by many known, as well as unknown creditors."' 21 Used as a
military prison during part of the war, the prison was in poor physical condition.2 2 Moreover, Union military authorities had utilized
the labor of the State's prisoners, which denied profits to the
State. 23 Perhaps the greatest damage to the prison's financial condition resulted from the war-time and postwar inability to acquire
supplies. 24 All of these problems were exacerbated by a rapid increase in the prison population.2 5
The postwar economic situation forced Tennessee to seek new
methods of controlling its debt. Leasing the labor of convicts to
private parties was an attractive solution to the prison problem because it clearly was less expensive than refurbishing the old prison
14.
15.
State of
16.
17.
18.
19.

5 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 122 (1959).
Id. at 153. According to two prison inspectors the prison "showed a profit to the
over fifty thousand dollars." Id.
1859-60 TENN. H. J., supra note 9, at 34, 643.
1859-60 TENN. S. J., supra note 13, at 198.
This senate bill is reprinted in 5 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 153-55 (1959).
1859-60 TENN. S. J., supra note 13, at 505 (rejecting bill by 9-12 vote).

20. Id. at 666.
21. Report of the Directorsof the Tennessee Penitentiary,1866-67
note 9, app. at 93 [hereinafter Report of the Directors].
22. R. CORLEW, TENNESSEE, A SHORT HISTORY (2d ed. 1981).
23. Crowe, supra note 4, at 122.
24. Id.
25. R. CORLEW, supra note 22, at 387.

TENN.

H. J., supra
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or building additional facilities.26 It even offered the tantalizing
possibility of a profit. Consequently, on May 12, 1866, the general
assembly enacted Chapter 34,27 which authorized the directors of

the penitentiary to lease out the labor of convicts for a four-year
term to the highest and best bidder. The directors, however, retained the authority to make rules to govern the prison so as "to
promote the health, comfort, order and discipline of the convicts,
and the proper deportment
of the lessee, officers, keepers and
28
guards of the prison.

Six parties responded to advertisements for bids. The lease
was awarded to Hyatt, Briggs, and Moore, a Nashville furniture
manufacturer, for forty-three cents per day. 29 This price was

higher than that of any other state of which the directors were
aware. 0 The directors clearly were enthusiastic about this undertaking31 and had a definite concept of their responsibilities.32 The
lease was signed July 16, 1866.
Within a year of the lease's signing however, the promise of
profits had vanished and the lease was mired in litigation. On June
22, 1867, a fire gutted one of the prison workshops, destroying
much of the lessees' machinery, stock, and material.3 Although the
lessees previously had made prompt payments, after the fire the
lessees discontinued payments and claimed damages. The legislature disagreed with the lessees' claim and ordered that a suit be
filed. 4
On January 8, 1869, the lessees submitted a written proposition to surrender the lease and to request an independent appraisal. 5 On February 15, 1869, the legislature passed a resolution
authorizing the suspension of the lawsuit pending arbitration.3
Four days later the general assembly passed an act accepting the
26. Id. at 125.
27. 1865-66 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. XXXIV, § 1.
28. Id. § 15.
29. Report of the Directors, supra note 21, at 94.
30. Id. at 95.
31. "The experience and practice, of all our older states, approve the system of leasing
out convict labor to responsible parties, as superior to that of self-supervisive." Id. at 94.
32. "It shall be our duty, to see that the least possible expense is incurred to the State
for the management of the convicts, now under our control." Id. at 96.
33. Tennessee v. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. 100, 102 (1871).
34. Id. at 103.
35. Id.; see 1868-69 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. L.
36. See Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. at 103; TENN. H.R. J. RES. LXXX, 35th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., reprinted in 1868-69 Tenn. Pub. Acts (first sess.) no. LXXX.
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lessees' proposition.3 7 The arbitrators disagreed, and the umpire
they selected ruled for the lessees.38 The lessees then sought a warrant from the comptroller, who declined to issue one.3 Consequently, the lessees filed a mandamus action to compel issuance of
the warrant. 40 The State and comptroller sought to enjoin the
mandamus action and asked that the appraisals and the State's
acceptance of the lessees' proposal be set aside for fraud.41 The
State also asked that the award be amended or set aside because of
mistake of law and other reasons.' 2
Governor Senter voiced concern in his legislative message of
October 12, 1869, that the suspension of the inmates' work during
litigation with the lessees would increase the financial burden of
the penitentiary on the State.' 3 The general assembly apparently
shared the Governor's concern. On December 18, 1869, the legislature passed an act to pay the lessees over 132,000 dollars for their
property and improvements pursuant to the February 19, 1869 act,
provided that the lessees surrendered possession of the prison and
other leased property without prejudice to the pending suits."4 The
lessees agreed.' 5 On the same day the general assembly passed a
resolution which provided that the prison could not be leased unless the lease was submitted to and approved by the general
6
assembly.4
The Tennessee Supreme Court ruled that the appraiser's valuation was fair.'7 The court's other rulings, however, were in the
State's favor. 4 The court held that the penitentiary's directors had
no authority to insert a provision in the lease requiring the State
to furnish a guard for each workshop. 9 Additionally, the court
held that the lessees were not entitled to damages incurred when
the Governor pardoned 350 convicts-approximately three-fourths
of the laborers-within a period of a few weeks, reasoning that the
37.

1868-69 Tenn. Pub. Acts (first sess.) ch. L.

38. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. at 105.
39. Id. at 106-07.
40. Id. at 107.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. 6 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 44 (1963).
44. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. at 107; 1869-70 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. XL.
45. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. at 108.
46. Id.; H.R. J. RES. XLVII, 36th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., reprinted in 1869-70 Tenn.
Pub. Acts (first sess.) no. XLVII.
47. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. at 108.
48. Id. at 118-36.
49. Id. at 118, 121-28.
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lessees voluntarily assumed this risk. 0 Finally, the court held that
the stone quarry was not part of the leased property and that the
State was entitled to payment for stone taken51from the quarry by
the lessees and for any unnecessary damages.
The legislature enacted a new law providing for the management of the penitentiary on February 5, 1870.52 The act expressly
repealed the prior Act of May 12, 1866, 53 and authorized the three
new inspectors to put convicts to work on the capitol grounds
whenever there were more convicts than could be worked profitably inside the prison."' No convict, however, was to be worked
55
outside the prison walls without the prisoner's written consent.

If

a surplus still existed, those convicts could be leased to private individuals or corporations for work either inside or outside the
prison.5 6 Apparently in response to the prior litigation, the law. expressly provided that the lease was subject to the Governor's pardoning power and the State had the right to manage the convicts
during the course of any pending litigation between the State and
the lessee.5
At first glance, the law of February 5, 1870, appears to be a
cautious response by a general assembly wary of being burned
again. Financial pressures, however, were the overriding concern of
the act. Section 9 of the act gave the prison inspectors authority to
lease out the convicts if the penitentiary became a financial burden
on the State.5 8 Moreover, under section 11 of the act, the general
assembly did not care whether the leases were made publicly or
privately.59 The general assembly's only concerns were the security
of the convicts and the achievement of financial self-sufficiency.
On May 5, 1870, a new state constitution went into effect.6 0
Article I, section 32, addressed prisons specifically: "[T]he erection
of safe and comfortable prisons, the inspection of prisons, and the
humane treatment of prisoners, shall be provided for."'" This sec50. Id. at 118-21.
51. Id. at 135-36.
52. 1869-70 Tenn. Pub. Acts (first sess.) ch. LIX.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 76. This provision was deleted four months later. See 1869-70 Tenn. Pub.
Acts (first sess.) ch. LIX, § 6.
56. Id.
57. Id. §9.
58. Id.

59. Id.
60.
61.

§ 11.

See Bilbrey v. Poston, 63 Tenn. 232 (1874).
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 32 (1870).
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tion was added to the Tennessee Constitution by the State Constitutional Convention of 1870, perhaps in response to the experiences of some of the State's leading citizens incarcerated by Union
authorities during the Civil War.62 Article I, section 32, did not address convict leasing expressly and did not appear to prohibit the
practice. All laws not inconsistent with the new constitution were
to continue in force until they expired, were altered, or were
63
repealed.

The act of February 1870 permitted authorities to work convicts anywhere in the State. Convicts were leased primarily to the
railroads.6 4 These leases were plagued with problems, including accidents, escapes, deaths, competition with free labor, administrative and supervisory difficulties, and the purely temporary nature
of the railroad employment.6 5 The mining industry seemed a more
attractive area for convict leasing. In the first place, branch prisons
could provide security. Second, because a labor shortage existed in
this area, administrators foresaw steady employment and few conflicts with free laborers. 6 Thus, in early 1871 the legislature passed
an act authorizing branch prisons to be established at Tracy City
67
and Battle Creek Mines.

In December 1871 the general assembly ratified a five-year
lease of convict labor to Thomas O'Conner and Robert Looney at
30,000 dollars per year. The lessees were members of Cherry,
O'Conner, and Company, manufacturers of agricultural implements.6 8 Almost half the leased convicts manufactured wagons inside the prison.6 9 The remainder of the convicts worked in mines,

on farms or railroads, or were subleased.7 1 Over a year later, Governor John C. Brown reported to the general assembly that the lessees were meeting their financial obligations promptly, had diversified the convicts' labor, and had reduced mechanical products by
fifty percent, thus lessening competition with free men.7 1 Accord62.

Laska, A Legal and Constitutional History of Tennessee, 1772-1972, 6

MEM.

ST.

U.L. REV. 563 (1976).
63. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1870).
64.

Crowe, supra note 4, at 131.

65. Id.
66.

Id. at 131-32.

67. 1871 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. CXXIII.
68.

S. J. Res. LXXXI, 37th Gen. Assembly, 1st Sess., reprinted in 1871 Tenn. Pub.

Acts no. LXXXI.
69. See generally J. WOOLRIDGE,
70.
71.

HISTORY OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

Crowe, supra note 4, at 134.
6 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 303-04 (1963).

(1890).
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ing to Governor Brown, Tennessee's prison system was more successful than that of Illinois, Pennsylvania, Arkansas, Mississippi,
Missouri, or Virginia, because those states spent large amounts of
money on their prisons.72
The Tennessee legislature passed a new convict lease act in
1875. 7 3 Apparently this act was not utilized or it created only
short-term leases, because in 1877 another lease act was passed
that permitted a six-year lease beginning August 1, 1877 .7 The
second act required that the State receive at least 50,000 dollars a
year from the lease after expenses. 76 A.M. Shook was awarded the
lease for 70,500 dollars a year.76 In 1883 the legislature extended
Shook's lease to January 1, 1884."
In March 1883 the general assembly also authorized a new sixyear lease to begin January 1, 1884.71 Its provisions were similar to
the 1877 lease, but it increased the minimum annual rent to
100,000 dollars.7 9 The lease was awarded to Tennessee Coal, Iron,
and Railroad Company for 101,000 dollars a year. s0 Forty percent
of the leased inmates were subleased to Cherry, Morrow, and Company for work in the main prison.8 1 Before the bids were opened,
these two companies agreed that, if either won the bid, they would
divide the inmate labor: sixty percent for Tennessee Coal, forty
percent for Cherry.8 2 Critics publicly raised charges of fraud and
collusion.8 3 No action was taken in response to the charges, however, and obligations under both the lease and sublease were fulfilled. According to Governor Bate's legislative message of January
12, 1885, Tennessee Coal used 772 prisoners in mines, and no free
laborers had been denied work because of the convict labor.8 The
remaining prisoners were used by Cherry, Morrow, and Company
manufacturing wagons, making furniture, working in the foundry,
72.
73.
74.
75.
than the
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See id. at 304.
1875 Tenn. Pub. Acts 114 ch. LXXXII.
1877 Tenn. Pub. Acts 114 ch. CLXX, § 2.
Id. ("But no lease shall be made in which the hire and rental secured shall be less
sum of $50,000 clear of all expenses. .. .
6 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 548 (1963).
1883 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. LII.
Id. at ch. CLXXI, § 2.
Id.
7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 154 (1967).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 118-19.
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and raising vegetables for the main prison. 5
Despite the continued use of the lease system, it was not without opposition. Prison reformers and free laborers opposed it. During the 1870s and 1880s the legislature conducted a number of investigations concerning the system, which often resulted in
majority reports finding the prisons satisfactory and minority reports condemning prison conditions and the lease system."' Governor Porter, in his message to the legislature of January 1, 1877,
flatly stated, "[t]he present system of employing convict labor is
wrong; but I am not certain that the general sentiment of the people of Tennessee is not in favor of it."1 He also complained of the
large number of escapes due to the subleasing of convicts to farmers and railroads. 8 Governor Bate also opposed the system, but
felt that economic necessity required its continuance.8 9 Nevertheless, in 1887 Governor Taylor argued that the lease system should
be abolished. 0
By 1889, however, Governor Taylor, recognizing that failure to
authorize a new lease would require tripling the prison's capacity, 91
reluctantly recommended continuing to lease the prison "in order
to give fair and intelligent consideration to what to do with [the
prisoners] and with the prison."92
The legislature therefore passed a new lease act similar to the
prior acts.9 A prisoner challenged the act in State ex rel. Warren
v. Jack,4 alleging that he was detained illegally in a branch prison.
The lower court held that the branch prison was illegal because it
was not under the control of prison authorities. 5 The Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment on the basis of
Chapter 204 of the Public Acts of 1889, which established the leasing system. That Act authorized branch prisons and imposed the
duty of control, management, and custody of the convicts on state
85. Id.
86. Id. at 308-09.
87. 6 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 466 (1963).
88. Id.
89. 7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 66 (1967). Bate served as governor from 1883-87.
90. Id. at 248.
91. Id. at 286.
92. Id. at 287.
93. 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 204.
94. 90 Tenn. 614 (1891).
95. Hutson, The Overthrow of the Convict Lease System in Tennessee, 8 E. TENN.
HisT. Soc's PUBLICATIONS 82, 85 (1936), citing 1893 TENN. S. J., supra note 13, app., Report
of Commissioner of Labor.
96. Jack, 90 Tenn. at 617.
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officials.9 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff was not denied his
liberty illegally because he remained "in the custody of a Warden,
acting under the supervision of the Board of Inspectors."98
By this time, resentment of the lease system was mounting,
particularly among free laborers. In the fall of 1891 tensions exploded when miners in East Tennessee stormed the branch prisons. 9 Between October 31 and November 2, 1891, angry miners set
free over 400 convicts from the branch prisons. 100 The State militia
temporarily ended the crisis by bringing in more convicts to work
the mines. 1°1 On August 10, 1892, however, the free miners at
Tracy City torched the convict stockade, took the convicts from
the mines, and placed them on a train bound for Nashville.0 2 The
convicts at the Inman Mine also were sent to the State capitol. 103 A
few days later, miners in Oliver Springs placed more convicts on a
train for Knoxville.10 4 Although the miners and the State militia
engaged in several skirmishes,0 5 neither the State nor the lessees
wished to terminate the lease. 0 6 Therefore, the stockades were reconstructed in the fall of 1892 and the convicts returned in the
company of the militia. 0 7 The convicts continued to work in the
mines until the lease system was abolished. 08
In 1892 all four gubernatorial candidates promised to abolish
the lease system. 09 The press and the public apparently approved
this position." 0 The general assembly in 1893 authorized the construction of a new penitentiary and the use of convict labor by the
State."" Only seven months before the existing lease was to end,
however, the new penitentiary was unfinished. Governor Turney
told the general assembly that it would be impossible for the State
to care for the inmates." 2 Accordingly, he recommended a compro97.
98.
99.
100.

1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 204.
See Jack, 90 Tenn. at 617, quoting 1889 Tenn. Pub. Acts, ch. 204, § 10..
Hutson, supra note 95, at 87.
Id. at 87-88.

101. Id. at 90-91.
102. Id. at 92.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 94.

105. Id. at 94-97.
106. Id. at 98.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 100.
Id.
1893 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 78.
7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 569-70 (1967).
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mise with the lessees under which the convicts would build parts of
the new penitentiary but the lessees would receive credit for that
labor. 113 Thus the lessees would be able to reduce their debt to the
State while the State was not forced to care for the convicts before
the penitentiary was completed." In apparent response to the
Governor's remarks, the general assembly permitted the prison officials to lease "such of the convicts as cannot be used in the mines
of the State or its farm, or in the construction of such parts of the
walls, buildings or appurtenances of the new penitentiary as may
not be let under contract." '15
The shift from the former system of leasing out convicts was
completed in 1897 when the legislature authorized the leasing of
convicts not otherwise employed to persons or firms who would operate a manufacturing or other business within the State penitentiary." ' The massive leasing of convicts for work outside the penitentiary ended. A return to the old leasing system, said Governor
Turney, would be "cruel in the extreme."" He asserted additionally that "[t]he State really made no money, but rather lost, by
leasing convicts on account of riots, outbreaks, and invasions."" 8
Nonetheless, the State continued trying to make the prison profitable. When the leasing of convicts to manufacturers within the
prison eventually became less profitable than using convict labor in
the State-owned coal mines, Governor Cox recommended, in 1907,
that prison officials engage more convicts in mining." 9 Thus, the
early years of the twentieth century witnessed the end of the convicting leasing system in Tennessee.
Today, Tennessee law requires that inmates "be kept at labor
when in sufficient health."' 20 Convicts are to work within the
prison, except as otherwise provided in the Tennessee Code.'
Work outside the prison is permitted only "in connection with the
duties and functions of the various departments, commissions and
divisions of state, municipal and county governments, and upon
property owned or leased to the state of Tennessee or its political
113. Id. at 570. The nature of the itigation mentioned in the Governor's remarks is

unknown to the authors.
114. Id. at 570.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

1895 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 7, § 19.
1897 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 39.
7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 600 (1967).
Id.
8 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 371-72 (1972).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-21-207(a) (1982).
Id. § 41-21-208(a).
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subdivisions."' 22
Tennessee's present experiment in privatization stems from
the State's apparent inability to operate the prison effectively. By
1978 a state court in Trigg v. Blanton found Tennessee's prison
system to violate article I, section 32 of the Tennessee Constitution
and the eighth amendment to the United States Constitution.' 23
Chancellor Ben H. Cantrell based his findings on a number of disturbing conditions including frequent violent attacks among inmates; overcrowded, dilapidated, and outmoded facilities; inadequate plumbing, heating, lighting, and ventilation; and inadequate
medical and mental health care. 24 The chancellor held that the
inmates have a right not to be incarcerated where conditions
threaten their health and well-being and cause physical, mental, or
social deterioration.' 25
During the same period a number of prisoners had filed pro se
civil rights lawsuits in federal court challenging the constitutionality of conditions in Tennessee prisons."6 Until 1981, the federal
courts in Tennessee abstained from exercising jurisdiction in deference to the pending state court action. In light of the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hanna v. Toner,127 however, the United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee appointed
counsel in the consolidated case Grubbs v. Bradley and determined
to proceed despite the pending state action. 12 8 As a result, the Tennessee Supreme Court ordered abstention in Trigg pending the
federal court's resolution of the Grubbs case. 2 The Tennessee
122. Id. § 41-21-208(b)(1).
123. See Grubbs v. Bradley, 552 F. Supp. 1052 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), citing Trigg v.
Blanton, No. A-6047 (Davidson County Ch. Aug. 23, 1978), retired on grounds of state abstention sub nom. Trigg v. Alexander, No. 81-2-I (Tenn. July 2, 1981).
124. Trigg v. Blanton, No. A-6047, slip op. at 31, 43-44 (Davidson County Ch. Aug. 23,
1978).
125. Id.
126. Grubbs, 552 F. Supp. at 1055.
127. 630 F.2d 442 (6th Cir. 1980).
128. Grubbs, 552 F. Supp. at 1056-57.
129. Id. at 1057. The Grubbs court stated that
Unfortunately, there has been no state court decision. On July 2, 1981, the Supreme
Court of Tennessee, in a decision that so far as this court is aware is wholly unprecedented in the annals of our federal system, ordered abstention by the state courts
pending federal resolution of the present case. Without considering whether such action may have amounted to an abdication of the duties assigned to state courts by the
Constitution and laws of Tennessee, the effect of the decision is clear: The task of
resolving the serious and politically sensitive constitutional claims raised by inmates
incarcerated by the State of Tennessee has been passed to the federal courts.
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court believed that two such lawsuits would be against the public
interest and cause duplication of effort. 130
After a trial in November and December 1981, which resulted
in over 20,000 pages of evidentiary material, the federal district
court concluded in August 1982 that certain conditions and practices in Tennessee prisons constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution and article I, sections 16 and 32 of the
Tennessee Constitution.13 ' Specifically, the following conditions
and practices were held unconstitutional: (1) "double celling" of
inmates in certain facilities; (2) confinement for more than one
week in a cell without hot water; (3) confinement in cell buildings
unfit for human habitation; (4) failure to maintain sanitary conditions for food storage, preparation, and service; (5) failure to protect inmates adequately from violent attack; (6) failure to provide
minimally adequate medical care; and (7) confinement for over one
week without physical exercise. 132 The State did not appeal the
court's decision. The court selected a special master to oversee the
State's program to correct these problems. Over the next three
years the State submitted and implemented plans addressing all of
the prisons' inadequacies.
In spite of the State's efforts, certain problems, particularly
overcrowding and the resulting violence, refused to disappear. An
April 1984 court order threatened to release immediately 3000 inmates if an agreement to reduce violence could not be reached. 33
In June 1985 the court ordered that the prison population be reduced to 7019 by December 31, 1985.13 On July 1, 1985, the Tennessee correctional system was rocked by inmate riots and disturbances in several facilities. The catalyst for the riots probably was
a "striped prison uniform law."'13 5 The disturbances brought Tennessee's prison problems to the public's attention in a way few
courts could.
On September 12, 1985, Nashville-based Corrections Corporation of American (CCA) made a dramatic offer to lease Tennessee's
130. See id.; see also Trigg v. Alexander, No. 81-2-1 (Tenn. July 2, 1981) (order retiring Trigg v. Blanton on grounds of state abstention).

131.

Id. at 1057, 1131-32.

132. Id. at 1131-32.
133. Grubbs v. Bradley, No. 274 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 6, 1984) (Morton, J.) (case no. 803404-Higgins-on appeal).
134. Grubbs v. Bradley, No. 329 (M.D. Tenn. June 27, 1985) (Higgins, J.).

135.
1986)).

1984 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 982 (codified as

TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 41-21-234 (Supp.
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prison system.1 3 6 CCA promised to pay the State fifty million dollars immediately and another fifty million dollars over the next
twenty years.1 3 7 Additionally, the company indicated that it would
spend one hundred fifty million dollars to build two maximum security institutions and renovate other facilities. 3 8 In return CCA
sought a ninety-nine year lease of the facilities of an annual
amount, not to exceed one hundred seventy-five million dollars the
first year, to operate the system." 9
During the fall of 1985 Tennessee's prison problems mounted.
Unable to meet inmate population reduction targets, the system
was operating far beyond its capacity. On October 25, 1985, Federal Judge Thomas A. Higgins ordered that no new convicts be admitted into the prison system's reception centers until the inmate
population was reduced to the system's total designated
40
capacity.1
Reacting to the State's difficulty in solving the prison
problems, Governor Lamar Alexander called a special session of
the general assembly to address the problems of the prison system.1 4 ' Subjects to be addressed included criminal sentencing, parole, correctional facilities, and budgets. In addition, Governor Alto consider the
exander specifically requested the 1 legislature
42
alternative of privatizing the prisons.
CCA's September 1985 proposal to privatize the prisons raised
as many questions as it purported to answer. In response to a number of questions about the legality of privatization, the Attorney
General of Tennessee wrote several letters and one formal opinion.
The Attorney General concluded that the State could not transfer
to a private entity its sovereign powers over the prisoners, nor
could it contract away its authority. 4 3 Traditionally, detention has
been considered an exclusive prerogative of the state.14 4 The sovereign powers delegated by the people are trusts that must be exer136. CCA Offers $250 Million for Prisons, Nashville Banner, Sept. 12, 1985, at 1, col.
1; Correction Corp. Seeks Lease to Run Tennessee's Prisons,Wall St. J., Sept. 13, 1985, at
45, col. 3.
137. See sources cited supra note 137.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Grubbs v. Bradley, No. 359 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 25, 1985) (Higgins, J.).
141. Governor's Proclamation of Oct. 31, 1985 (on file with Authors).
142. Id.
143. Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. No. 85-286 (1985); see also Letter from the Office of the
Tennessee Attorney General to the Governor and Speakers of the Houses of the Tennessee
General Assembly (Oct. 18, 1985) [hereinafter Letter] (on file with Authors).
144. Medina v. O'Neill, 589 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D. Tex. 1984).
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cised personally by government officials. "[T]he idea of a transfer
or delegation thereof, being in direct opposition to the design and
ends of their creation."' 4 5 Similarly, one Tennessee court has
stated that "[n]o governmental entity can by contract deprive itself of inherent powers necessary to the performance of its functions or of power or duty imposed upon it by prior express statutory or constitutional provision."14' 6
The Attorney General of Tennessee stated that allowing
divestments of the State's sovereign power would permit "a renunciation of power to legislate for the preservation of society or to
secure the performance of essential governmental duties.' 4 7 The
Attorney General viewed State ex rel. Warren v. Jack14 8 as buttressing its conclusions. Under the act in question in Jack, the
State retained the control, management, and custody of the convicts. The court held that the inmate was not illegally confined
"[s]o long as he remains in the custody of a Warden, acting under
the supervision of the Board of Inspectors.' ' 4 9 The Attorney General did note that it might be permissible to delegate something
less than "control and custody," which was defined as "the authority to promulgate the rules and regulations under which the prisoners will be governed, the determination as to when discipline is
appropriate and the ability to ensure that non-state personnel are
implementing the directives of the State."' 50 The Attorney General
concluded that "control and custody" did not require the State to
administer and operate directly the daily operations of the
prison. 15'
The Attorney General also reached the following conclusions:
(1) Present law permitted the state to contract with a private contractor to build a prison, but legislative action probably was necessary to permit a private firm to operate one or more correctional
facilities; (2) the general assembly could require by statute that
certain provisions be included in the contract; (3) the State could
not avoid continued civil rights litigation merely by privatizing one
or more facilities; (4) a bankruptcy of the private contractor could
145.
146.
Davis v.
(1948).
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

State v. Armstrong, 35 Tenn. 634, 656 (1856).
Batson v. Pleasant View Util. Dist., 592 S.W.2d 578, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1979);
Beeler, 185 Tenn. 638, 207 S.W.2d 343 (1947), appeal dismissed 333 U.S. 859
Contributors to the Pa. Hosp. v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 23 (1917).
90 Tenn. 614 (1891).
Id. at 617.
Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen., supra note 143, at 20.
Id. at 9.
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impair the State's ability to control the facility; (5) the contractor's
guards probably would have the right to strike; and (6) the State
might have problems resuming operation of a facility if the private
operator ceased performance of the contract.'52
The general assembly did not enact any legislation regarding
privatization during the 1985 special session on prisons. In the
1986 regular session of the general assembly, Senate Bill No. 1684,
sponsored by Senator Longley and others was introduced in the
senate, and its companion bill, House Bill No. 1334, sponsored by
15
Representative Tanner and others, was introduced in the house. 3
As introduced originally, the Bill authorized the Governor to enter
into contracts with private prison contractors for the construction
and operation of a new 500 bed maximum or medium security cor5
rectional facility and an existing regional correctional facility.' 4
The contract could not exceed fifty years, and the Code provisions
requiring approval and supervision of the construction, renovation,
or lease by the State Building Commission would not apply. 55 The
Commissioner of Corrections would monitor the contract and retain authority, among other things, to approve procedures for calculating inmate release and parole eligibility dates, approve recommendations regarding good time credits, and approve all furloughs
and work releases. 56 The Bill also required that the contractor not
57
benefit financially from the labor of inmates.1
The Bill was the subject of intense lobbying by CCA. Although
the Bill passed the house committees without much problem, it almost failed in the senate State and Local Government Committee.
On March 11, 1986, by a vote of five to four the committee tabled
the Bill. 58 Several weeks later, after the Bill's sponsors had agreed
to an amendment that placed more restrictions on the private
lessee, one senator changed his position, enabling the Bill to be
voted out of committee.
The senate adopted the amendment that effectively rewrote
the Bill. 59 After lengthy debate, the senate passed the amended
152. Id.; see also Letter, supra note 143.
153. 1986 TENN. S. J., supra note 13, at 1804; 1986 TENN. H. J., supra note 9, at 2069.
154. TENN. S. RES. 1684, 94th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1986); TENN. H. RES. 1334, 94th
Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. § 2 (1986).
155. TENN. S. RES. 1684, supra note 154; TENN. H. RES. 1334, supra note 154, § 3.
156. TENN. H. REs. 1334, supra note 154, § 5.
157. Id. § 6.
158. Now codified as TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-101 to 41-24-115 (Supp. 1986).
159. 1986 TENN. S. J., supra note 13, at 2957 (adopting the amendment).
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Bill on April 11, 1986.160 The house passed an identical Bill on
April 17, 1986.161 Governor Alexander signed the legislation on
May 1, 1986, and the Bill became Public Chapter 932.16
The preamble of the Private Prison Contracting Act of 1986
makes clear the experimental nature of the Act:
[The Act authorized] the Executive to contract with private concerns on a
limited basis to afford an opportunity to determine if savings and efficiencies
can be effected for the operation of correctional facilities and at the same
time assure that
the interests of the state's citizens and employees can be
63
fully protected.

Although the Act authorizes contracts for a variety of services,
including education, recreation, food services, medical services,
transportation, and counseling,1 64 contracts for the operation of
correctional facilities are limited expressly to a three-year term 6 5
and to the Carter County Work Camp. 6 Moreover, all contract
proposals are subject to an extensive review, comment, and ap7
proval process. 1
In addition to limits on the scope of privatization, the Act also
imposes several requirements on all contract proposals. For instance, the proposer's annual cost, defined as the proposed offer
plus the estimated cost of monitoring the contract, must be at least
five percent less than the estimated annual cost to the State of
providing contracted-for services. 6" The level and quality of the
proposed services must be at least equal to those provided by the
State.""9 Additionally, the proposal must provide an adequate plan
of insurance, whose adequacy will be determined by an independent risk management or actuarial firm.'
Apparently in response to the Attorney General's concern that
the State retain control over the prisoners,17 ' the Act expressly
provides that the contractor can not be given the following responsibilities: (1) developing and implementing procedures for calculating inmate release and parole eligibility dates; (2) developing and
160. Id. (passing the bill as amended).
161. 1986 TENN. H. J., supra note 9, at 1373.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Now codified at TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 41-24-101 to 41-24-115 (Supp. 1986).
1986 Tenn. Pub. Acts ch. 932.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-103(b) (Supp. 1986).
Id. § 41-24-105(a).
Id. § 41-24-103(c).
Id. § 41-24-104(a).
Id. § 41-24-104(c).
Id. § 41-24-104(c)(2).
Id. § 41-24-107(a)(2).
Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen., supra note 145.
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implementing procedures for calculating and awarding sentence
credits; (3) approving inmates for furlough and work release; (4)
approving the type of work inmates may perform and the wages or
sentence credits that may be given to inmates engaging in such
work; and (5) granting, denying, or revoking sentence credits; placing an inmate under less restrictive custody or more restrictive
custody; or taking any disciplinary actions.172
Soon after the Act's passage, the Department of Correction
formed an interdepartmental working group to issue a Request for
Proposals (RFP).7's The working group issued the RFP on October
1, 1986, but only one company made a proposal, which was rejected on November 17, 1986.
Despite its attempts to address the legal concerns outlined by
the Attorney General's Office, the Act already has been challenged
in the courts. Two lawsuits, one by Local 2173 of the American
Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees and three
Department of Correction employees and the other by five inmates
in the Tennessee State Prison, were filed to challenge the constitutionality of the Act on a number of grounds. 74 Davidson County
Chancellor Robert Brandt, however, dismissed the complaints on
November 24, 1986, holding that the plaintiffs' lacked standing
and that there was no
justiciable controversy under the Declara75
tory Judgment Act.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The present privatization initiative in Tennessee is neither
identical to, nor wholly unlike, the past practice of convict leasing.
Certainly, today's version of privatization does not seek to make
convicts pay for their keep or to profit from the convicts' labor. On
the other hand, the movements share the goal of reducing the cost
of incarceration. The chief difference between the two movements
is not so much the motivation as it is today's recognition that the
State should bear the burden of funding the prison system. Today
privatization is seen as a possible method of reducing that burden,
172. TENN. CODE ANN. § 41-24-110 (Supp. 1986).
173. A "Request for Proposals" is a statement by the agency listing the requirements

for a bid.
174. Local 2173 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Alexander,
No. 86-1909 (Davidson County Ch. Aug. 21, 1986); Al-Mahagmin v. Alexander, No. 86-1910
(Davidson County Ch. Aug. 21, 1986).
175. Local 2173 and Al-Mahagmin were dismissed by order of Chancellor Brandt on
November 24, 1986. Davidson County Ch. Ct. Minute Book 39, page 703.
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not eliminating it.
While reducing costs is probably the most important reason
for privatizing correctional facilities, frustration with an overcrowded, ineffective, and inefficient correctional system also has
been a powerful motive. Rather than releasing persons who are
willing to live within society's laws, Tennessee's prisons, statistically, turn out a large number of persons who will be repeat offenders. Instead of a "State Mechanic Institute," as Andrew Johnson
labeled it, the prison system may have become a "State Criminal
Institute" that turns out better prepared criminals. This frustration is compounded by the fact that Tennessee's prison system is
no longer a problem that can be ignored. The federal courts will
not permit the State to continue its past practices and have ordered major reforms to bring the prison system within constitutional limits. Facilities must be built or renovated, new educational
and vocational programs implemented, and a host of other
problems corrected before the federal courts will relinquish
oversight.
The survey of past practice in Tennessee teaches a number of
lessons. First and foremost, the State must retain custody and control of its inmates. This principle does not forbid contracts with
private companies to operate correctional facilities, but it does
limit to what extent the State may divest itself of the responsibility for operating a prison facility.
Second, the contract cannot limit the constitutional powers of
the State or its officers. For example, the contractor assumes the
risk that the Governor will exercise his pardoning power. Indeed,
since the State cannot bargain away its police powers, it likely
would possess the authority to alter the terms of the contract or
abrogate it altogether if the agreement in any way limits those
17 6
powers.
Third, once an institution is privatized, reversing the process
might be quite difficult. In 1889 Governor Taylor told the legislature that discontinuing the lease system would require a significant
expansion of the State's prison facilities. He reluctantly recommended a new lease in order to provide time to decide what to do
in the future. 177 Again, in 1895, with the new penitentiary not yet
completed, Governor Turney was forced to recommend the contin176. Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen., supra note 145.
177. 7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 286-87 (1967).
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uation of leasing. 18 Today, as the Attorney General's Office has
indicated the State would face the same problem upon termination
of a prison contract.'79
Fourth, litigation arises in the corrections area with regularity.
At least five cases regarding convict leases were decided between
1879 and 1896.180 There is no reason to believe, in an even more
litigious society, that frequent litigation would not be a continual
problem. Indeed, two lawsuits have been filed in Tennessee already
and the State has yet to adopt a contract."8 ' The State certainly
will be involved in any lawsuits arising out of incidents at a privately operated facility, whether the suits relate specifically to the
leasing arrangement or address the more common prison issues.
Privatization will not lessen the burdens on the State's attorneys
or reduce the need for them. Indeed, privatization itself may give
rise to extremely complicated lawsuits.
Fifth, concerned State officials must closely and continually
scrutinize the prison system if privatization is to work properly.
The history of convict leasing shows that State supervision was
often inadequate. Even when supervision did occur, State officials
frequently allowed lessees to force the prisoners to live and work in
unfit and unsafe conditions. The practice of convict leasing is not
an aspect of this State's history that can be looked upon with
pride. Although the federal courts will not allow that history to be
repeated, Tennessee should not rely on the federal government to
force the State to operate its prisons within constitutional bounds.
The State prison officials have constitutional, statutory, and moral
obligations to see that Tennessee's prisons are safe, comfortable,
and humane. Strict oversight is the only way to ensure that privately operated facilities meet these obligations.
Privatization of correctional institutions offers possible benefits: reduced costs and better programs for inmates. The costs are
178. Id. at 570.
179. According to the Attorney General's office, "immediate and significant expenses
would be incurred when the State reassumed management of the institution. Administrative
difficulties would also be present regardless of whether the State's management became a
permanent arrangement or another private company was found to manage the facility." Op.
Tenn. Att'y Gen., supra note 143. Similar problems could occur when a contract expires, but
it would be possible to plan ahead for such problems.
180. Tennessee v. Ward & Briggs, 56 Tenn. 100 (1871); State ex rel. Warren v. Jack,
90 Tenn. 614 (1891); 7 MESSAGES, supra note 8, at 570 (1967).
181. Local 2173 of the Am. Fed'n of State, County, & Mun. Employees v. Alexander,
No. 86-1909 (Davidson County Ch. Aug. 21, 1986); Al-Managmin v. Alexander, No. 86-1910
(Davidson County Ch. Aug. 21, 1986).
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reduced through less burdensome purchasing requirements, more
efficient management, and other innovations that are stimulated
by the profit motive. Yet privatization has risks. The American
Bar Association has urged a halt in the prison privatization movement "until the complex constitutional, statutory, and contractual
issues are developed and resolved."1'82 This is not an area analogous to providing hospitals or fire protection. Operating correctional facilities is more than a traditional state function: the state
has no higher duty than to ensure that those persons who violate
society's laws are punished. Fulfilling that duty is essential to the
integrity of the government and to the protection of the public. It
is not a duty that can legally or morally be handed to a private
party and then ignored. The involvement of private parties in the
corrections process may produce benefits, but it must be limited to
its proper scope under state control.

182.

American Bar Association Resolution of February 1986.

